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Abstract: ‘Safe harbour’ is shorthand for a bundle of privileges in insolvency which are 
typically afforded to financial institutions. They are remotely comparable to security interests as 
they provide a financial institution with a considerably better position as compared to other 
creditors should one of its counterparties fail or become insolvent. Safe harbours have been 
introduced widely and continue to be introduced in financial markets. The common rationale 
for such safe harbours is that the protection against the fallout of the counterparty’s insolvency 
contributes to systemic stability, as the feared ‘domino effect’ of insolvencies is not triggered 
from the outset. However, safe harbours are also criticised for accelerating contagion in the 
financial market in times of crisis and making the market more risky. This paper submits that 
the more important argument for the existence of safe harbours is liquidity in the financial 
market. Safe harbour rules do away with a number of legal concepts, notably those attached to 
traditional security, and thereby allow for an exponentiation of liquidity. Normative decisions 
of the legislator sanction safe harbours as modern markets could not exist without these high 
levels of liquidity. To the extent that safe harbours accelerate contagion in terms of crisis, 
which in principle is a valid argument, specific regulation is well suited to correct this situation, 
whereas a repeal or significant restriction of the safe harbours would be counterproductive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the financial industry was 
proud to boast that its standard contracts, the so-called ‘master agreements’, 
documenting derivative, repo and other types of financial transactions1 worth 
trillions of US dollars in value,2 had withstood the destructive pressure resulting 
from the downfall of Lehman Brothers, one of the biggest players in the market.3 
This was taken as substantiating the value of the risk mitigation mechanisms 
included in these agreements. It is probably fair to say that risk mitigation is the 
most important function of these master agreements.4 Their significance is readily 
illustrated by a comparison with the real estate market. As the real estate market in 
its present form would not exist without concepts such as mortgage or hypothec, 
the modern financial market would not exist without master agreements and their 
built-in risk mitigation mechanisms, notably termination, close-out netting and 
collateral. That is to say, what is discussed in this article refers to a cornerstone of 
our modern economies.   
                                                                                                              
1 This article, for ease of reference, generally refers to derivative and sale-and-repurchase (‘repo’) 
transactions. In a derivative contract, the obligations of the parties depend on a reference value which 
typically changes over time, e.g. the market price of a basket of shares. Derivatives are generally (but not 
necessarily) documented under the master agreement promoted by the International Swaps and Derivates 
Association (ISDA), which is not publicly available. Repos are functionally akin to a secured loan but 
different from the legal perspective: an asset is sold against a cash payment and bought back at a later 
point in time at a slightly different price. Repos are often documented under the Global Master 
Repurchase Agreement (GMRA)  <http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Legal/GMRA-
2011/GMRA-2011/GMRA%202011_2011.04.20_formular.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. However, safe 
harbours generally also cover other types of contracts, such as securities lending, dealings in foreign 
exchange, financial instruments, precious metals, etc., see UNIDROIT, Principles on the Operation of 
Close-out Netting Provisions (2013), Principle 4 and accompanying commentary 
<http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/netting> accessed 10 March 2015. There are 
many different national, regional and international master agreements, see for further examples P Paech, 
The Need for an International Instrument on the Enforceability of Close-out Netting in General and in the Context of 
Bank Resolution, (2011) UNIDROIT Study S78c, Doc. 2, 11 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2011/study78c/s-78c-02-e.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
2 To provide a fragmentary and regionally limited picture: at the end of June 2014 the world-wide 
outstanding gross market value of over-the-counter derivatives was about 17.5tn USD, see Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), Derivatives Statistics, Table 19 
<http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm> accessed 10 March 2015. On 8 October 2014 the value of 
total outstanding repo transactions in the USA was 3.88tn USD, see A Copeland and others, ‘Lifting the 
Veil on the U.S. Bilateral Repo Market’ <http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2014/07/lifting-
the-veil-on-the-us-bilateral-repo-market.html#.VP3J6ELd7wx> last accessed on 10 March 2015. At the 
European end of the repo market, the total value of the repo contracts outstanding on the books of the 
65 institutions that participated in the relevant survey was EUR 5.7tn EUR in June 2014, see 
International Capital Markets Association, ‘European Repo Market Survey, Number 27’ 
<http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-
Markets/repo/latest/> last accessed 10 March 2015. 
3 In relation to the fall-out from the (pre-crisis) Enron scandal see ISDA, ‘Enron: Corporate Failure, 
Market Success’ paper delivered at the 17th Annual General Meeting, Berlin, 17 April 2002, 10-15 
<http://www.isda.org/whatsnew/pdf/EnronFinal4121.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
4 Master agreements provide the general advantages of widely used standard contracts, such as common 
terminology, compatibility, etc. The ISDA Master Agreement, for instance, further adds provisions on 
taxation and on multi-branch scenarios. 
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In the event of a financial institution’s insolvency or similar event, a master 
agreement limits the credit risk5 of its financial counterparties.6 Master agreements 
enable financial counterparties to liquidate entire portfolios of open contracts as 
soon as the other part fails or otherwise becomes a greater risk.7 Prompt 
liquidation of all derivatives and repo positions leaves the counterparties with a 
relatively modest amount to pay to or, respectively, claim from the failing 
institution. Accordingly, their potential loss remains comparably small and they do 
not incur the risk of watching their contracts becoming entangled in lengthy 
insolvency proceedings that might be opened over the failing firm.  
The laws of most developed financial markets make sure that these — purely 
contractual — arrangements are enforceable despite the fact that the liquidation 
arrangements made under master agreements somehow contravene the pari passu 
principle,8 much as in the case of security interests. The insolvency law provisions 
that guarantee the enforceability of master agreements in the event of insolvency 
are generally referred to in the context of US bankruptcy law as the ‘safe harbour’ 
rules.9 In this article, I will use this catchy label also in relation to other 
jurisdictions, albeit with the caveat that safe harbours and their context differ from 
one jurisdiction to another, as will be shown below.  
The rationale for the privileged treatment arising under insolvency safe 
harbours appears to be two-fold. The part of the rationale that occupies the less 
prominent place in the policy debate concerns increased market liquidity through 
an increased volume of repo and derivatives transactions. Quite comparably to 
‘traditional’ security interests,10 safe harbours encourage financial institutions to 
                                                                                                              
5 Counterparty credit risk refers to the potential loss suffered by a party if its counterparty fails, in 
particular in case of insolvency. It basically corresponds to the replacement value of an unperformed 
contract (A fails and B, while neither has to perform, loses the value that their contract had for it). The 
risk only exists in relation to transactions that have a positive value for the solvent party. Counterparty 
credit risk is different from settlement risk (A fails before performing on the contract, while B has already 
performed). 
6 ‘Financial institutions’ is used here in the colloquial sense, and includes banks, investment firms and 
many other types of business intervening in the financial markets, see P Paech, ‘Close-out Netting, 
Insolvency Law and Conflict-of-laws’ (2013) 14-2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 419, 443-444. 
‘Financial counterparty’ is often used to refer to a counterparty which is a financial institution.  
7 Typically, ‘events of default’ refer to events where one party fails to comply with its obligations, e.g. 
performance, breach of contractual warranties or representations, etc. ‘Termination events’ refer to 
instances where no-one is at fault but the circumstances change, such as a merger of a party, taxation, etc. 
Both allow for immediate termination and liquidation of the contracts covered by the master agreement. 
8 For ease of reference, this article adopts a broad understanding of pari passu as the principle of equal 
treatment of general creditors which informs three questions, notably which assets are available for 
distribution, who participates in the distribution and how the assets should be shared amongst the general 
creditors (notably pro rata). However, these three issues differ conceptually, see, for example, M Bridge 
and J Braithwaite, ‘Private Law and Financial Crisis’, (2013) 13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 361, 
367-370; J Peck, R Mokal and T Janger, ‘Financial Engineering Meets Chapter 11 Safe Harbors and the 
Bankruptcy Code’ (2011) Working Paper, 2-3 
<http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1402065/1/Peck,%20Mokal%20and%20Janger%20on%20Safe%20Harbors
%20and%20the%20Bankruptcy%20Code.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
9   For an overview of the incremental development of US safe harbour rules see C Mooney, ‘The 
Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors for Settlement Payments and Securities Contracts: When is Safe too 
Safe?’ (2014) 49 Texas International Law Journal, 245, 247-251.  
10 In the following I refer to ‘traditional security interests’, meaning arrangements such as, in particular, 
pledge, mortgage, hypothec and charge. This is to facilitate the distinction with the most popular form of 
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enter into these contracts by considerably reducing the degree of counterparty risk 
to which they are exposed. The second, more prominently voiced rationale refers 
to the fact that financial institutions, especially those of systemic importance, 
deserve special treatment. This is because they handle risks that can rapidly turn 
incalculable, and because of the probability of contagion in the market should one 
of these systemically important institutions fail.11 This situation, where a financial 
market participant fails because its own counterparty had failed before is often 
described as ‘a domino of insolvencies’ or, more generally, systemic risk.12 This 
second rationale is about decreasing overall systemic risk in the financial market. 
However, the value of the special protection afforded by safe harbours may 
be questioned.13 Particularly in the wake of the latest financial crisis, safe harbours 
may be regarded as extending unjustified privileges to financial institutions which 
produce negative externalities overall, not least since their cost is borne by non-
financial market participants and other stakeholders, including society as a whole. 
Safe harbours may be suspected of destroying real economic value, of increasing 
rather than reducing systemic risk, and ultimately of allowing the socialisation of 
the financial industry’s losses and thus of promoting moral hazard. In the end, 
they may turn out to be no more than the product of path-dependent legislation 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
securing an obligation in the financial market, so called title-transfer collateral, which is an agreement 
where the obligor transfers full (legal and beneficial) title over assets which are to be re-transferred once 
the debt has been discharged. Also, ‘traditional security interests’ helps to avoid confusion with 
‘securities’, such as, in particular, shares and bonds. 
11 See Unidroit Principles on Close-out Netting (n 1), Principle 4 – Key Considerations. When Safe 
harbours where introduced in the USA in 1978, stability of the commodities market was the main 
rationale, on which later expansions were equally built: American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI), 
Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 – Final Report and Recommendations (2014) 94-95 
<https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h> accessed 10 March 2015.  
12 For an explanation of systemic risk, see GG Kaufman and KE Scott, ‘What is systemic risk, and do 
bank regulators retard or contribute to it?’, The Independent Review VII 3 (2003), 371-391.  
13 See RR Bliss, and GG Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout’, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2005-3 (2005) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=730648> accessed 10 March 2015; FR Edwards 
and ER Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?’ (2005) 22 Yale 
Journal on Regulation, 91-122; SL Lubben, 'Derivatives and Bankruptcy: the Flawed Case for Special 
Treatment' (2009) 12-1 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 61-78; ‘Repeal the Safe 
Harbors’, (2010) 18 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 319-335; The Bankruptcy Case without 
Safe Harbors’ (2010) 84 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 123-144; E Perotti, ‘Systemic Liquidity Risk 
and Bankruptcy Exceptions’ (2010) DSF Policy Paper Series No 8 
<http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/114634> accessed 10 March 2015; JM Peck, R Mokal and T Janger, 
‘Financial Engineering Meets Chapter 11 Safe Harbors and the Bankruptcy Code’ (2011) 
<http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1402065/1/Peck,%20Mokal%20and%20Janger%20on%20Safe%20Harbors
%20and%20the%20Bankruptcy%20Code.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015; MJ Roe, ‘The Derivatives 
Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator’ (2011) 63 Stanford Law Review 539-589; D 
Duffie and D Skeel, ‘A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and 
Repurchase Agreements’ University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics, 
Research Paper No. 12-2 (2012) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982095> 
accessed 10 March 2015. DA Skeel and TH Jackson, ‘Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in 
Bankruptcy’ (2012) 112 Columbia Law Review 152-202; SL Schwarcz and O Sharon, ‘The Bankruptcy 
Law Safe-Harbor for Derivatives: a Path-Dependence Analysis’, (2014) 71 Wash & Lee Law Review 
1715-1755; ER Morrison, MJ Roe an CS Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Safe Harbours’ (2014) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2484565> accessed 10 March 2015.  
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originating in the banks’ own lobbying efforts. Therefore, curtailing or even 
abolishing safe harbours and leading financial institutions back into the ‘regular’ 
insolvency regime may help to dismantle the aforementioned distortions and 
decrease the risks inherent in the financial market. 
Discussing these assumptions takes us straight back to the two prongs of the 
rationale of safe harbour rules. Again, as we know from the context of traditional 
security interests, it is debatable to what extent there is overall social and economic 
value in allowing parties to circumvent the pari passu baseline of distribution 
through private bargaining, leading to a shift of the risk away from those with 
higher bargaining power (typically banks) to the broader economy. It is ultimately 
the legislator who transforms the result of that debate into a normative policy 
decision as to the extent to which insolvency privileges are available.14  
My main goal is to remove the biases that have dominated the debate so far. 
Therefore, this article places the safe harbours into a broader context, notably by 
looking at jurisdictions other than the US and by adopting a cross-jurisdictional 
view, as opposed to an idiosyncratic one which is incongruent with the 
international character of financial markets. Furthermore, I believe that insolvency 
law cannot be considered in isolation but must be viewed together with other 
areas of law, notably financial regulation.15 In particular, the new global soft law 
standards, especially those set by the G20 States, are currently gaining 
unprecedented momentum and are likely to dominate the debate to a much 
greater extent than will considerations of domestic insolvency law policy. 
Regulation is an area of the law that has far greater impact on risk mitigation in the 
financial market than insolvency law could ever achieve. This issue ties in with the 
dispute on the insolvency ‘axioms,’16 i.e. the question of what insolvency law can 
and should achieve, in particular in motivating market participants to adopt a 
certain type of conduct while they are still going concerns.  
In the second section, I will widen the perspective to jurisdictions other than 
the US since the picture there is quite different. However, differences between 
jurisdictions relate not so much to the safe harbour regime (which is fairly 
homogeneous globally speaking) as to the gap between the safe harbour, on the 
one hand, and the generally applicable insolvency regime, on the other hand: in the 
US, that gap is considerably more pronounced than it is in other jurisdictions 
(England, Germany, Italy and Belgium will serve as examples here). As a result, 
the polarity between the treatment of the financial and the non-financial world —
which generally informs the debate in the context of debtor-friendly US 
bankruptcy law — is the exception rather than the rule. It will become clear that 
                                                                                                              
14 See V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 601. 
15 The differentiation between financial ‘law’ and financial ‘regulation’ is not very clear and partly 
nonsensical.  However, for the present purpose one might think of ‘law’ as addressing horizontal rights 
between, in particular, creditors and debtors or owners and non-owners, whereas ‘regulation’ addresses 
the vertical State-to-market relationship, mainly working on the basis of orders, prohibitions and 
sanctions for non-compliance.  
16 DG Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale L J 573-599; See V Finch, ‘Security, 
Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 633-670. 
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jurisdictions with a more creditor-friendly approach to insolvency policy are much 
more inclined to embrace the notion of insolvency safe harbours. 
The third section addresses the less prominently discussed, but probably 
more relevant rationale for safe harbours, that of increased liquidity.17 Much like 
the rationale underlying traditional security interests, which are typically introduced 
to strengthen lending markets,18 safe harbour rules allow for more liquidity in the 
relevant derivatives and repo markets. However, the economic advantages of safe 
harbours go far beyond the known effects of traditional security interests. They 
create remarkable flexibility across different types of asset, i.e. money, claims and 
securities. At the same time, they do away with certain legal categorisations, in 
particular that between collateral provided under a full title transfer, on the one 
hand, and collateral provided by means of creating a traditional security interest, 
on the other hand. This gives financial institutions scope for a type of risk 
management where all positions may be used for all purposes and throughout all 
jurisdictions that admit safe harbours. Under the safe harbour protection, the use 
of collateral becomes extremely efficient—or, viewed from a different perspective, 
it would be fair to say that safe harbours allow the available collateral cover to be 
stretched more and more thinly. 
The fourth section addresses the reduction of systemic risk as the more 
prominent rationale for providing safe harbours. While the base argument — i.e. 
that reducing individual counterparty risks leads to reduced overall systemic risk 
— looks relatively straightforward, there would appear to be two potential 
antagonists to the effect of safe harbours which render a discussion much more 
complex. The first antagonist is moral hazard. It stands to reason that considerably 
lower counterparty risk is likely to trigger a more lenient approach to matters of 
creditworthiness of counterparties — however, whether this will lead to a riskier 
market overall remains difficult to assess. It is equally unclear whether it should be 
the role of insolvency law at all to control market participants’ conduct while they 
are going concerns. The second antagonist is the effect of mass liquidation in the 
event of failure of a financial institution. Safe harbours may rapidly cause the 
liquidation of the greater part of the portfolio, thereby triggering collateral 
shortages affecting the entire market. Discussing both antagonists leads us straight 
into the question of the growing role of regulation in limiting systemic risk. To 
begin with, bank resolution regimes are now being introduced all over the globe. 
These are novel administrative measures that fall outside traditional categories of 
insolvency proceedings and are precisely aimed at avoiding the systemic impact of 
bank failures. Furthermore, there are now regulatory measures (some under 
preparation, others already implemented) focused on specific aspects of avoiding 
                                                                                                              
17   ‘Liquidity’ is the ability to sell any asset for other assets or cash at will, K Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of 
Finance’ (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative Economics 315-330, 316.  
18 See Finch, ibid 637. 
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systemic risk. As a consequence, the immediate relevance of systemic risk 
mitigation through safe harbours is considerably reduced.  
The final section pulls together the various aspects and attempts to draw an 
overall picture of the value of safe harbours. It concludes that safe harbours in 
their current form are necessary for a functioning derivatives and repo market and 
for the modern financial market as a whole, and that they have highly positive 
effects on liquidity — it is true that the collateral cover in the market can be 
stretched very thinly on the basis of safe harbours but this effect is better 
controlled by regulation. In that sense, the systemic risk rationale for safe harbours 
is somewhat at odds with reality. Insolvency law should not be concerned with 
attempting to mitigate systemic risk in the market: despite its obvious influence on 
managerial decisions it is too bold a concept and not suitable for controlling the 
behaviour of financial institutions. Measures belonging to the sphere of financial 
regulation, such as those mentioned above, are much more effective in this regard. 
These measures are compatible with and complementary to safe harbour rules. It 
would be highly counterproductive to repeal or restrict the latter.  
 
 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRIVILEGE19 
 
When a market participant fails or becomes insolvent, each and every one of its 
business partners will face three fundamental questions:20 first, am I bound to 
those of our contracts that are still open, or may I terminate and liquidate them? 
Secondly, do I have swift access to the collateral or security provided in my favour 
(if any) or do I need to wait before I can enforce it? Thirdly, are earlier actions of 
my counterparty which were in my favour, such as recent payments or recent 
delivery of security or collateral, potentially subject to avoidance by the insolvency 
official or court? The answers provided by insolvency laws around the world may 
differ: the solvent party may or may not be allowed to terminate the contracts, it 
may or may not be allowed to enforce the collateral, and the extent to which 
recent acts beneficial to certain creditors are subject to avoidance by the 
insolvency official or court differs, too. These questions are particularly important 
for financial institutions, especially in respect of their derivative contracts, 
repurchase agreements or similar transactions with the insolvent party. It is not 
uncommon for two financial institutions to have hundreds or even thousands of 
open financial contracts with one another at any given point in time. Therefore, 
the answers provided by insolvency law to the aforementioned questions generally 
affect contracts and collateral of an enormous combined value.  
                                                                                                              
19 I am grateful to Giulia Pecce and Sebastiaan Bierens, both research assistants at the LSE Department 
of Law, for researching the relevant Italian and Belgian law referred to in this section. 
20  See Mooney, ‘The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors’ (n 9) 249.   
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The insolvency laws of most developed financial markets21 generally take a 
favourable approach to the financial industry and their financial contracts: 
contracts can be terminated and the collateral swiftly enforced and, generally, 
earlier payments or delivery of collateral cannot be avoided by the insolvency 
official. These, in plain language, are the effects of safe harbour rules. This 
approach is remarkably homogeneous across developed markets.22  
However, safe harbours are more of an exception to generally applicable 
insolvency law in some jurisdictions than in others, largely because the starting 
point of the general insolvency law rules is different. In other words, the ‘privilege’ 
can be more or less significant. The critique voiced by US authors is partly based 
on the argument that the treatment of the financial industry is diametrically 
opposed to the treatment afforded to other, non-financial market participants:23 
non-financial counterparties are not allowed to terminate in the run-up to 
insolvency, nor can they access their collateral, nor are they subject to avoidance 
by the insolvency official or court. However, this polarity is particularly pertinent 
to US law. As will be shown below, in other jurisdictions the picture is different 
simply because the starting point of insolvency law is different. Accordingly, it 
would be inappropriate to transplant the debate from the US to other jurisdictions 
without first examining these differences.  
One clarification is in order here. Comparing the relevant US and EU laws 
poses a structural difficulty from the outset. In the US, the safe harbour rules are 
federal law contained in the United States Code.24 They form part of the general 
provisions of Title 11 ‘Bankruptcy’, and as a consequence apply in both Chapter 7 
‘Liquidation’ and Chapter 11 ‘Reorganisation’. The Code is directly applicable and 
self-contained. EU law contains a relevant set of rules spread over a number of 
instruments, most prominently (but not exclusively) the Financial Collateral 
Directive and the Banks’ Winding-up Directive.25 EU directives are not directly 
applicable or self-contained and therefore do not afford much insight into legal 
reality. They require implementation into national law, i.e. their rules are cast into 
the relevant domestic statutes, such as domestic insolvency law, secured 
transactions law, bank regulation and other statutes. As a consequence, we have 
not a single set of EU safe harbour rules but 28 of them. This article duly looks at 
                                                                                                              
21 At the moment, ISDA refers to 43 jurisdictions as having close-out netting-friendly legislation, i.e. 
insolvency safe harbour rules, in place <http://www.isda.org/docproj/stat_of_net_leg.html#f1> 
accessed 10 March 2015. 
22 E.g., see the US and European rules listed in n 25, n 34, and n 43. 
23 Lubben, ‘Repeal the Safe Harbors’ (n 13) 322-326; Roe, ‘The Derivatives Markets Payment Priorities’ 
(n 12) 547-549; Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors’ (n 12) 4-8. 
24 On the gradual expansion of the USC safe harbours see M Krimminger, ‚The Evolution of U.S. 
Insolvency Law for Financial Market Contracts’ (2006) Working Paper 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916345> accessed 10 March 2015.  
25 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial 
collateral arrangements, OJ L168/43 of 27.6.2002; Directive 2001/24/EC of 4 April 2001 on the 
reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, OJ L125/15 of 5.5.2001. See on the EU framework 
P Paech, ‘Close-out Netting’ (n 6) 434-439.  
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EU law through the filter of concrete jurisdictions with different legal traditions, 
notably England and Germany, Belgium and Italy. The respective legal regimes for 
the treatment of financial contracts in insolvency differ slightly, as the standards 
set by the relevant EU directives are not very detailed and allow for considerable 
differences in implementation. In addition, where the national law was already in 
line with the requirements set by the relevant EU directives, formal 
implementation was not required, which means that the directive can be 
considered as having been implemented without any actual changes having been 
made to the national law. 
 
LIQUIDATION OF CONTRACTS 
 
The principal building block of master agreements consists of provisions allowing 
one party to liquidate, en bloc, all executory contracts should a termination or 
default event occur. The term ‘close-out netting’ is often used instead of 
liquidation in that context. Close-out netting involves a number logical steps: first, 
termination of the relevant bundle of contracts; secondly, determination of the 
value of each contract; thirdly, set-off of the positive and negative values so that 
only a net balance is owing; and, fourthly, acceleration of the resulting payment 
obligation.26 The safe harbour rules27 of the relevant forum ensure that the close-
out netting mechanism contained in the master agreement remains enforceable 
beyond the counterparty’s insolvency.28 
In US law, by contrast, termination of executory contracts upon insolvency 
motivated solely by the financial position of the insolvent (‘ipso-facto clause’) is 
expressly prohibited and the set-off of any debt owing to the debtor is stayed from 
the moment the petition is filed.29 Also, the trustee can cherry-pick, choosing 
contracts favourable to the insolvent estate and rejecting the others, thus 
disintegrating what was originally intended for liquidation en bloc.30 As a result, the 
non-defaulting party must perform on contracts that are unfavourable from its 
point of view or else pay damages (largely corresponding to the replacement cost) 
                                                                                                              
26 The liquidation mechanisms provided for in the different master agreements do not necessarily work 
exactly in the same way but the functional result remains the same, see Unidroit Principles on Close-out 
Netting (n 1), Principle 2 with commentary. 
27 Articles 4(4), 7(4) Financial Collateral Directive; 11 USC §§ 362(b)(6)-(7)-(17)-(27) and (o); 555-556, 
559-561; s12(1) Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulation (UK); §104 Insolvenzordnung 
(Germany); Article 14 Loi relative aux sûretés financières (Belgium); Italy: Article 7 Decreto legislativo 
n. 170 in material di contratti di garanzia finanziaria. For a generic functional clause, see UNIDROIT 
Principles on Close-out Netting, Principle 7 with commentary. There are three different ways of allowing 
liquidation of contracts after opening of insolvency proceedings, notably carve-out, plain reference or 
mandatory statutory rule, see, Paech, ‘Close-out Netting’ (n 22), 430-431. 
28 As long as parties are solvent, contractual provisions to that effect are unproblematic and can be freely 
operated as an expression of the principle of freedom of contract. However, should a party become 
insolvent, that principle might be overridden by mandatory rules of insolvency law, thus hindering in 
particular termination and set-off of the bundle of contracts. 
29 11 USC §§ 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1); § 362(a)(7). Ipso facto clauses where still permitted under the US 
Bankruptcy Act of 1908: R.M. Goode, “Perpetual trustee and flip clauses in swap transactions“ (2011) 
127 LQR 1, 8.  
30 11 USC § 365(a).  
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for non-performance, yet will receive only part of the damages provided for those 
broken contracts that are favourable to it. It is worth emphasising that these 
principles apply not only in the context of reorganisation proceedings but also in 
the event of liquidation, evidence that the idea of saving a business is paramount 
in US bankruptcy law, or, in other words, of its pronounced debtor-friendliness. 
By contrast, other jurisdictions are less debtor-friendly and more creditor-
friendly, regardless of whether they belong to the common law or the civil law 
tradition. Most prominently, England is much more creditor-friendly, and the 
general legal position in respect of liquidation of contracts upon insolvency was 
traditionally such that the later implementation of the EU Financial Collateral 
Directive did not require fundamental changes to the regime in place. In England, 
termination and set-off upon insolvency have always been possible, also in a non-
financial context.31 Under German law, the treatment of non-financial scenarios is 
much closer to the English position than to that of the US, with far-reaching 
termination and set-off rights also for non-financial counterparties.32 Belgium has 
                                                                                                              
31 Termination upon insolvency is considered on the basis of the anti-deprivation principle, according to 
which a contractual provision cannot stipulate insolvency as an event that is to deprive the debtor 
company of an asset held at the time of the commencement of insolvency proceedings. The principle 
applies in both the winding-up and the administration scenario (Belmont Park Investment Pty v BNY corporate 
Trustee Services Ltd [2011] UKSC 38, [2011] 3 WLR 521, affirming Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v BNY 
Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1160, [2010] Ch 347). Agreements to terminate a limited 
interest conferred on another, or providing for automatic termination of that interest, if that other 
becomes insolvent do not contravene the anti-deprivation rule (RM Goode, 'Perpetual Trustee and Flip 
Clauses in Swap Transactions' (2011) 127 Law Quarterly Review 1, 8). The underlying idea is that 
insolvency law does not override freedom of contract where no question of a sham transaction has arisen 
(Lord Neuberger MR in Perpetual Trustee, ibid, at [91]. Cf the parallel reasoning of the Bundesgerichtshof, n 
32). As regards set-off, in England insolvency set-off kicks in upon commencement of the proceedings, 
which applies to all mutual credits, debts, or other mutual dealings between the insolvent and its 
counterparty (Insolvency Rules 1986 (as amended), rule 2.85 (for administration) and rule 4.90). It is 
mandatory, retroactive and self-executing (MS Fashions Ltd v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA 
(No. 2) [1993] per Hoffman LJ at 432-433; Stein v Blake [1996] 1 A.C. 243 per Lord Hoffmann at 253). 
However, it does not cover executory contracts but only obligations. Therefore, in principle, the 
liquidator has general cherry-picking powers (Insolvency Act 1986 s 178(3)). Still, as termination remains 
possible, parties can always agree on automatic termination should one of them become insolvent which 
would turn their executory contracts  into simple payment obligations to which mandatory insolvency 
set-off would then apply (Goode, Principles of corporate insolvency law, para 9-43). See also Peck, Mokal 
and Janger, ‘Financial Engineering’ (n 8), 4-6. 
32 Termination clauses are only void to the extent that they refer to the commencement of proceedings as 
the relevant trigger (Insolvenzordnung § 119), but are valid as a matter of contractual freedom if they 
refer to an event prior to commencement, such as default or filing of the bankruptcy petition, since the 
insolvency official has to accept the estate as is (BGH ZIP 1994, 40, 42; BGHZ 96, 34, 37-38. Note that 
the Bundesgerichtshof rejects the idea of any retroactive effect of the statutory ipso facto prohibition, 
whereas the English Court of Appeal (n 28), with the same reasoning, allows even ipso facto clauses that 
refer to insolvency itself as the trigger event.). As a consequence, contractual termination before 
commencement of proceedings remains enforceable. To the extent that there is no such termination 
clause, creditors are bound to their contracts and subject to cherry-picking. However, as a general rule 
which not only applies to financial contracts but generally, where forward contracts over assets that have 
an ascertainable market value or are quoted on an exchange stipulate performance for a post-
commencement point in time, the insolvency official cannot choose performance. Instead, he can only 
claim a compensation payment, corresponding to the difference between market value and agreed price, 
provided the debtor is in the money; if the creditor is in the money, he has to prove for that difference in 
the proceedings. This means that such forward contracts are terminated by operation of law. Most 
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introduced legislation that affords identical treatment in insolvency to financial 
and non-financial counterparties, which leaves only situations involving natural 
persons not acting in a merchant capacity to the general regime. The law expressly 
provides for close-out netting agreements to be enforceable.33 Lastly, the Italian 
legal regime is also applicable to non-financial scenarios and does not differ 
significantly from the framework applicable to financial institutions,34 although it 
makes an exception for large corporations.35  
 
SWIFT ACCESS TO COLLATERAL 
 
The second element of safe harbours relates to the timely enforceability of 
collateral in insolvency, i.e., to the question of whether a secured counterparty may 
have immediate recourse to the collateral assets. The general approach in respect 
of financial counterparties is that they can immediately enforce collateral provided 
by the insolvent, without prior authorisation or similar requirements.36  
In the US, again, this contrasts with the general approach taken in respect of 
non-financial counterparties. Outside the safe harbours, enforcement of security 
or collateral requires prior application to the court called upon to grant relief in 
case of otherwise inadequate protection of the secured creditor or if the asset is 
not essential to effective reorganisation.37 
This clearly contrasts with English law, where the general policy is very 
different from that in the US. In winding-up proceedings, creditors are largely 
unaffected by the liquidation process as they can remove their security from the 
pool and realise it.38 In administration (remotely comparable to US 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
importantly, though, set off continues to be available to the creditor even after commencement of 
proceedings, provided that the mutual claims existed at that point in time (Insolvenzordnung §§ 94-96. If 
claims become due or congeneric only in the course of the proceedings, set-off must wait until then. If 
obligations are in different currencies or units, conversion is possible to make them congeneric.). The 
continued availability of set-off combines with the validity of pre-commencement termination: 
termination values can be set off even if proceedings have commenced in the meantime. 
33 Article 14 Loi relative aux sûretés financières. 
34 Termination and close-out netting provisions in the context of reorganisation proceedings are 
enforceable and do not succumb to the relevant proceeding. Similarly, in the liquidation scenario, the 
enforceability of liquidation and close-out rights is not affected unless the competent court authorises the 
continuation of the business of the defaulting party. In that case, the termination of financial derivatives 
would be suspended until the continuation comes to an end but rights under the termination and close-
out netting would 'revive' in case of default by the Italian party to pay scheduled amounts, 
notwithstanding the continuation of the business.  
35 Within special reorganisation proceedings for large companies the right to terminate and set-off is not 
recognised. However, the insolvency officials of the relevant proceeding would probably not be allowed 
to cherry-pick outstanding transactions under the master agreement that are favourable to the defaulting 
party and reject those that are disadvantageous for the latter. Instead, the insolvency official’s choice to 
continue the master agreement applies to the whole bundle of covered transactions. 
36 See Article 4(4) and (5) FCD; UNIDROIT Principle 7(1)(a); 11 USC § 362(b)(6)-(7)-(17)-(27) and (o). 
37 11 USC § 362(a) and (d). 
38 Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2011, para 8-47. Collateral 
can be used in the ordinary course of business without an application to the court; cash collateral may 
only be used with consent of creditor or the court. Only if the liquidator refuses to release the security 
asset must the creditor obtain leave of the court, which will almost invariably be granted since what is 
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reorganisation), the approach is obviously different and closer to the US model, as 
the secured creditor is dependent on leave from the court to enforce its security; 
this will usually be granted if significant loss to the secured creditor is likely to 
result from a refusal.39 Only substantially greater losses caused to others by such 
leave may outweigh the interest of the secured creditor.40 This is where the 
implementation of the Financial Collateral Directive has a significant impact, as it 
explicitly abolishes the requirement of court approval for transactions that come 
within its scope.41 
Under German law, the general position42 is that pledged movables are 
generally realised by the insolvency official for a secured creditor entitled to direct 
the manner in which the asset is realised and to whom immediate payment is made 
from the proceeds. Interest is due as from the day of the commencement of 
proceedings. The asset can also be transferred to the creditor if that is the most 
suitable solution. The insolvency official does, however, have the right to use the 
asset for the estate, in which case compensation has to be paid to the secured 
creditor for any deterioration of the asset affecting the security. In this respect, the 
German regime is comparable to the US model. The privilege afforded to financial 
counterparties consists in the fact that pledged financial collateral is exempt from 
this regime and can be realised by the counterparty unaffected by the 
commencement of proceedings.43 The Belgian Financial Collateral law provides – 
for all market participants except natural persons – that the enforcement rights of 
those creditors benefiting from financial collateral are not suspended as long as the 
agreement creating the financial collateral was executed before the date of the 
bankruptcy order. The beneficiary of a share pledge has the right to appropriate 
the shares upon default of the pledgor. No prior notice or authorisation is 
required if appropriation is expressly permitted in the pledge agreement.44  
 
PROTECTION AGAINST AVOIDANCE 
 
The third element relates to avoidance. In the insolvency of a financial institution, 
its counterparties are privileged because the right of the insolvency official to 
avoid prior legal acts on the ground that they constituted preferential treatment of 
a creditor or was an undervalue transaction is heavily curtailed as compared to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
involved is not property of the insolvent. Goode, ibid, referring to James LJ in Re David Lloyd & Co (1877) 
6 Ch. D. 339 at 344-345. 
39 Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule B1 para. 43(2). But note the ability of the administrator to use cash 
collateral in case of a floating charge without consent of the creditor or court, ibid, para 70. 
40 Nicholls LJ in Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [1992] Ch. 505 at 543. 
41 Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulation 2003, reg. 8; it is however unclear whether the 
concept of  ‘control’ captures floating charges, see Look Chan Ho, ‘The Financial Collateral Directive’s 
Practice in England’ (2011) JIBLR 151, 158-159.  
42 Insolvenzordnung §§ 166, 169, 170, 172. 
43 Insolvenzordnung §§ 166(3), 173(1). 
44 Article 8 Loi relative aux sûretés financières. Although no prior court approval is required, the law 
provides for the possibility for the courts to exercise some form of control afterwards, see Article 8(3)s. 
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general insolvency law.45 Again, the gap between general insolvency law and the 
privileged safe harbour regime may vary depending on the jurisdiction. However, 
as to avoidance, the picture differs from the findings of the foregoing sections. 
Here, the privilege afforded to financial institutions is of similar significance 
throughout, as robust avoidance rules for non-financial market participants exist in 
the US as well as in England, Germany, Belgium and Italy.  
In the US, the general position is that creditors who have received payment 
or a security interest within 90 days prior to the commencement of bankruptcy 
proceedings are, as a rule, required to return it, except if the transfer was for value 
or undertaken in the ordinary course of business.46 In English administration or 
liquidation proceedings, where the creditor is not a financial institution, avoidance 
is possible in case of undervalue transactions for a period of two years, and in case 
of preferential treatment of a creditor for a period of six months.47 However, the 
transaction cannot be avoided if, in an undervalue scenario, the insolvent company 
was in good faith and for the purpose of carrying on its business and there were 
reasonable grounds for believing that the transaction would benefit the company, 
or, respectively, in a preferential treatment scenario, unless the insolvent company 
was influenced in deciding to give it by a desire to prefer a given creditor. Under 
German law, transactions can be avoided for preference within a three-month 
period prior to commencement of proceedings if the creditor knew about the 
insolvency of the debtor or if it could not have been unaware of it.48 Undervalue 
transactions can be avoided without any further ado if they occurred during the 
last month before the commencement of insolvency proceedings, or if they 
occurred during the second or third month before insolvency if the debtor was 
insolvent at that point in time or if the creditor knew that other creditors would be 
prejudiced or if that fact was obvious to it.49 Belgian law contains a number of 
discretionary and automatic claw-back rules that apply during a six-month period 
prior to the commencement of proceedings, whereas avoidance of fraudulent 
transfers is not subject to a time limit.50 Under Italian law, transactions at 
undervalue are invalid if entered into during the two years prior to commencement 
of proceedings. Furthermore, payments falling due on the day of the 
commencement of proceedings or thereafter are equally void if made during that 
                                                                                                              
45 See 11 USC § 546(g), (j); Article 8(1)-(3) Financial Collateral Directive. European jurisdictions are to a 
large extent free to set the parameters for avoidance as the Directive leaves this issue largely to the law of 
the Member States, exempting only a number of standard situations of constructive preferential treatment 
from avoidance. See also UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting, Principle 7(1)(c)-(d). However, 
regularly, fraudulent transactions are not protected, see 11 USC § 546(e); Recital 16 Financial Collateral 
Directive; Unidroit Principles on Close-out Netting, Principle 7(2). 
46 11 USC §§ 547. 
47 Insolvency Act 1986, ss 238, 239. Avoidance for preference is possible during a two-year period if the 
preferred creditor is connected with the company, s 240. 
48 Insolvenzordnung § 130. Variation margins provided under financial collateral arrangements are 
expressly exempt. Interestingly, the rule expressly states that the exemption takes effect only to the extent 
that the additional margin reflects the changes in value of the secured obligation. This requirement seems 
to have been inserted to avoid the problem of systematic under-collateralisation, see text to n 98 - 105. 
49 Insolvenzordnung § 131. 
50 Bankrupty Act (Belgium) of 8 August 1997, Articles 12, 17, 18 and 20.  
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two-year period. Fraudulent transactions can be voided if entered into during a 
suspect period of six months or one year, depending on the type of transaction.51 
 
 
  
EXPONENTIATED LIQUIDITY  
 
The strong polarity of the insolvency treatment of the financial sector, on the one 
hand, and of the non-financial sector, on the other hand, such as currently exists 
under US law, seems to be the exception rather than the rule. In other 
jurisdictions, the gap between the safe harbour regime and the general insolvency 
rules is much smaller and in some cases, the treatment of financial and non-
financial scenarios is even identical or quasi-identical, at least as regards 
termination, set-off and swift access to collateral. The only exception is the regime 
for avoidance. Here, safe harbour rules afford considerable relief to the financial 
industry, not only in the US but also in other jurisdictions. The more obvious 
consequence of the above finding is that the perception of egregious privileges 
afforded to financial institutions can only be upheld in a domestic tunnel vision.52 
Moreover, and more importantly, the above findings tie in seamlessly with the 
distorted view on the rationale for safe harbours. Liquidity as a main argument is 
not appropriate in a rather debtor-friendly environment such as the US 
Bankruptcy Code, which is why greater prominence is given, at least on the 
surface, to the systemic risk argument. In more creditor-friendly jurisdictions, 
which put greater emphasis on assets flowing back into the economy quickly, there 
is obviously more room for a rationale based on liquidity and market efficiency.53 
Unlike the case of traditional security interests, the liquidity rationale of safe 
harbours has never received the degree of prominence in the policy debate it 
would have deserved.54 This is surprising, also because it may be safely assumed, in 
the light of lessons learned from the latest financial crisis, that in lobbying for safe 
harbours, the financial industry was probably focused more on business 
development than on risk limitation.55 
                                                                                                              
51 Art 64-67 Italian Bankrupty Act.  
52 See Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors, 12: ‘But if the safe harbours 
increase social welfare because they increase liquidity overall (and not just the benefited creditors at the 
expense of other creditors), then the safe harbours should apply to all secured debt, not just financial 
contracts.’ 
53 ISDA, Memorandum on the Template for Netting Legislation (March 2006).   
<http://www2.isda.org/search?headerSearch=1&keyword=model+netting> accessed 10 March 2015.  
54 See Bliss and Kaufmann, Derivatives and Systemic Risk, 15-16. See Recitals 12 and 19 Financial 
Collateral Directive. See also ISDA, Memorandum (n 53) where the word ‘risk’ appears eight times, 
whereas ‘liquidity’ is not mentioned at all; ABI, Reform of Chapter 11, (n 11) Section IV.E on ‘Financial 
contracts, derivatives and safe harbour protection’ mentions liquidity as a policy argument only once, and 
in the context of a side issue, whereas ‘stability’ is referred to eleven times. 
55 See Bliss and Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk, 3. 
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On the face of it, safe harbours produce economic effects quite similar to 
those associated with the protection of traditional security interests in insolvency.56 
Because parties need not worry about their counterparty’s solvency, derivatives 
and repo contracts become more easily available, and at a reduced cost, thereby 
considerably improving liquidity in these market segments. As a result, the basic 
economic effect of safe harbours is considerable growth in volumes of the 
relevant types of transaction  (as could be observed in the run-up to the financial 
crisis, as repo markets doubled within 5 years57) and more efficient allocation of 
assets.  
In considering whether to introduce insolvency privileges, legislators must 
take into account the fact that such privileges almost automatically entail a shift of 
the risk from one segment of the market to another, the latter being potentially a 
shift to ‘weaker’ creditors (as will be discussed later). In this regard, too, there are 
no fundamental differences between traditional security interests and safe 
harbours. Therefore, the basic assumptions about liquidity and the resulting 
discussion about the overall social value of insolvency privileges are very similar to 
those prevailing in the case of traditional security interests58 and will not be 
addressed here. Rather, I will concentrate on four novel effects of safe harbour 
rules that represent a quantum step in terms of increasing liquidity, in particular if 
taken in combination with one another. 
 
FLEXIBILITY ACROSS LEGAL CATEGORIES AND ASSET TYPES 
 
The risk mitigation techniques of master agreements (as protected by the safe 
harbour rules) are used to abolish established legal boundaries. In particular, 
differences between full title and security interest disappear, and boundaries 
between claims, cash and securities become blurred. This high degree of flexibility 
is nothing less than revolutionary, overthrowing traditional legal restrictions on the 
use of assets with a view to obtaining cash and creating liquidity more generally. 
This is the result of the combined use of the techniques available under safe 
harbour rules, notably enforceable termination and netting of contracts, 
enforceable collateral and limitation of insolvency avoidance. The EU Financial 
Collateral Directive contains a paradigmatic blueprint for this phenomenon.59  
First, the differences between full title and security interests disappear 
because the safe harbours sanction the use of title transfer collateral, netting and 
‘margining’.60 Under such arrangements, while the collateral provider is protected 
                                                                                                              
56 General reference e.g. to V Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk’ (n 16) 637-643. 
57 See Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review, December 2008 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0812e.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
58 See, e.g., V Finch, 'Security, Insolvency and Risk' (n 16); LA Bebchuk and J Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case 
for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 857-934. 
59 See Articles 3-8 Financial Collateral Directive. 
60 Margining is necessary because both the obligation and the value of the collateral asset typically change 
over time. Therefore, collateral levels are adjusted to the exposure on a daily basis. The obligation to post 
collateral might reverse in the course of the term of the contract.  
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as efficiently as it would be under a traditional security interest such as a pledge or 
mortgage, the collateral taker enjoys far greater freedom to use the collateral assets 
than it would under a traditional security interest, in that it becomes the legal and 
beneficial owner of the asset and can therefore dispose of it, without being obliged 
to return that specific asset as long as the asset returned is of the same kind. What 
is remarkable here is that the rights of one party appear to grow whereas the risk 
borne by the other party remains unchanged. 
Furthermore, the boundaries between claims, money and securities become 
blurred as the collateral provider can validly substitute new collateral assets for the 
assets originally provided, which it might need for other purposes.61 The only 
proviso is that the replacement assets must be of substantially equivalent value. As 
a consequence, the collateral provider is allowed to replace one kind of securities 
collateral for another, or give cash for securities collateral, or securities for cash 
collateral.  
On that basis, the specificity of the collateral assets becomes as irrelevant as 
their nature (money, claims or securities). Positions become interchangeable and 
the collateral provider will collateralise all available assets as efficiently as possible, 
thereby creating maximum return. The fact that assets are freed from the 
conceptual burdens associated with legal limits to traditional security interests 
makes it possible to treat them as a mere accounting position, the only parameter 
being current market value. Thus, thanks to the existence of safe harbours, a 
derivatives and repo portfolio resembles a gigantic current account into which 
assets and liabilities, including collateral of whatever description, accruing under 
whichever type of arrangement, can be booked at current market value, so as to 
show the net exposure as a grand total.  
 
STRETCHING THE COLLATERAL COVER THINLY 
 
A phenomenon closely connected to the foregoing is the fact that safe harbour 
rules enable collateral to be allocated so efficiently that there will hardly be any 
collateral buffers around. Here, again, we are in the presence of a change in the 
legal environment brought about by the introduction of safe harbour rules.  
The first aspect here is the effect of the enforceability of close-out netting on 
collateral levels. If a risk reduction of 80% can be taken for granted62, parties will, 
                                                                                                              
61 ‘Substitution’ describes a right to withdraw financial collateral on providing, financial collateral of 
substantially the same value, see, e.g., Article 8(3)(b) Financial Collateral Directive. 
62 The Bank for International Settlements provides data illustrating the effect of close-out netting in 
relation to the example of the derivatives market (the effects are comparable in relation to the repo and 
securities lending market): the notional amount (face value) of all types of OTC contracts stood at 
approximately USD 693 trillion at the end of June 2013. The gross market value of these contracts, i.e., 
the cost of replacing all of them by equivalent contracts at the market price, was approximately USD 20 
trillion. This amount corresponds to the gross market risk inherent in these contracts, i.e., market 
participants were, on an aggregate basis, exposed to each other by that sum. At the same time, market 
participants’ aggregate actual credit exposures, i.e., the remaining credit risk taking into account legally 
enforceable master agreements, amounted to USD 3.9 trillion, which represents a risk reduction of about 
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of course, only collateralise the remaining 20%. Hence, much less collateral will be 
needed from the outset or, to put it differently, the same amount of collateral will 
suffice to cover a higher volume of transactions.  
At the same time, master agreements make it possible constantly to adjust 
collateral levels to the underlying exposures so as to avoid over or under-
collateralisation. These margining mechanisms rely on the safe-harbour limitation 
of avoidance powers as they might otherwise be classified as late provision of 
collateral.  
Lastly, safe harbours enable the re-use of collateral assets by the collateral 
taker, given that the latter generally becomes their legal and beneficial owner. 
Therefore, as opposed to what is common in other markets (which are bound to 
traditional secured transactions, lack of safe harbour protection), the collateral 
taker will generally put the collateral assets to use instead of just ‘holding’ them, 
thereby maintaining the assets in constant flow.  
The result of the foregoing is that asset allocation is extremely efficient 
throughout the market. However, by the same token, it may also mean that the 
cover becomes extremely thin, as there are no longer any pools of unused assets. 
 
SOURCING COLLATERAL GLOBALLY 
 
Collateral assets are scarce and sourcing them from a wider market would 
therefore be beneficial in terms of liquidity. However, before the broad 
introduction of safe harbour rules, financial institutions had to rely on domestic 
secured financing law. The diversity of mandatory insolvency and property law 
nurtured substantial doubts as to the cross-jurisdictional enforceability of close-out 
netting and collateral.63 Cross-border collateral was possible but complicated to 
arrange, and each arrangement was only compatible within the two jurisdictions 
involved. The most prominent move to address this issue was the introduction of 
the Financial Collateral Directive, which created a harmonised safe harbour regime 
across the EU. However, the phenomenon is not confined to the EU as safe 
harbour rules are relatively homogeneous throughout all jurisdictions that have 
developed financial markets,64 whereby the safe harbours of the Financial 
Collateral Directive are particularly broad. As a consequence, there is a 
harmonised legal space in which financial institutions can source and use collateral 
quasi-globally.  
Harmonisation works through the congruent removal, in the relevant 
jurisdictions, of legal restrictions, in particular through the de facto abolition of 
traditional security interests in the context of derivative and repo transactions —
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
80 %. See Bank for International Settlements, OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-June 2013 (November 2013), 
2, available online at <http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1311.pdf>, last accessed on 4 January 2014. 
63 See, regarding enforceability of collateral: P Paech, ‘Market Needs as Paradigm – Breaking up the 
Thinking on EU Securities Law’, in PH Conac, L Thévenoz and U Segna (eds), Intermediated Securities, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013), 22-64; in relation to enforceability of close-out netting: ‘Close-out 
Netting’ (n 6). 
64 See above, 2nd Section. 
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collateral is now generally provided on the basis of full title transfer. The fact that 
there is now a level legal environment is illustrated by the circumstance that 
derivatives and repo transactions can be documented in most markets under the 
same master agreements. In particular, the ISDA Master Agreement gained global 
significance65 because its functionalities (termination, liquidation, set-off, 
collateral) are now recognised in the relevant jurisdictions. At the same time, the 
restriction of avoidance powers removes fears of re-characterisation, claw-back 
and similar court actions that would endanger the functioning of the risk 
mitigation mechanism. Despite the fact that many legal differences remain as to 
detail, it is probably fair to say that the market for collateral, and therefore the 
market for derivatives and repos, comes close to having a globally harmonised 
legal framework.66 The extensive introduction of safe harbour rules is actually a 
significant example of market-driven high-impact international legal 
harmonisation67, somehow silently overcoming statutory legal hurdles that parties 
could not derogate from. Mandatory insolvency and property law were typically 
the most considerable threats to enforceability of contracts. However, at statutory 
level, despite considerable efforts, States were to date unable to agree on a cross-
border-compatible legal framework.68 Harmonisation on the basis of introducing 
safe harbours not only lessens the importance of domestic policy towards 
insolvency but also reduces the importance of legal considerations in risk 
management altogether.  
 
EFFICIENT USE OF REGULATORY CAPITAL 
 
Lastly, banking regulation sanctions the liquidity thus increased by the safe 
harbours. Notably, it recognises the net exposures used by financial institutions for 
risk management purposes also with a view to calculating capital requirements. 
Safe harbour rules are fundamentally important in this context because the 
relevant regulatory rules require absolute certainty that close-out netting and 
collateral will be enforceable in the event of insolvency.69 If that is so, banks are 
allowed to calculate their regulatory capital on the basis of net, rather than gross, 
credit risk exposures. As mentioned earlier, the average risk reduction through 
netting is roughly 80%. In order to grasp the effect of this significant reduction, it 
may be helpful to recall that regulatory capital is not, as is often assumed, a 
                                                                                                              
65 See Briggs J in Lomas & ors v JFB Firth Rixson, Inc & ors [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch) at [53].  
66 Remarkably, the law governing the cross-jurisdictional transfer of property over securities is still 
entirely national and therefore probably the only piece of that globalisation puzzle that is still missing.  
67 See Bliss and Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk, 2. 
68 The Geneva Securities Convention and the Hague Securities Convention, both addressing the issues of 
cross-border securities collateral, were adopted by a considerable number of States (amongst the those of 
the EU, the USA, Japan and many other major financial markets) but never ratified. 
69 Bank for International Settlements/Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Comprehensive version), June 2006, <www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbs128.htm> (‘Basel II Accord’), [117.], [118.], [139.], [188.]; Strengthening the resilience of the banking 
sector, (Consultative Document), December 2009, <www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf?noframes=1>,  43. 
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requirement to hold certain cash reserves available. Rather, regulatory capital 
describes the ratio between risk exposure and the capital raised by issuing own 
shares. As a consequence of the recognition of net risk in a safe harbour 
environment, a bank is able to enter six times the gross risk in its balance sheet 
that it would otherwise be allowed to accept.70 
The effect is two-fold.71 First, availability and liquidity of repo transactions 
are improved because absolute regulatory limits accommodate a higher volume 
where calculation on a net basis is allowed. In other words, safe harbours allow for 
more contracts under identical regulatory caps. This effect is not necessarily 
confined to derivatives and repo transactions but extends across the balance sheet 
to any other risk-taking activity such as ordinary lending. If less capital is needed as 
a consequence of safe harbours to match derivatives and repo transactions, 
ordinary lending activity may likewise be increased. The second effect is a cost-
saving element for banks, since share capital is a relatively expensive means of 
financing. If more contracts of a higher aggregate volume can be entered on the 
basis of the relevant available share capital base, the relative cost of share capital 
decreases. 
 
 
  
A SYSTEMIC RISK ZERO-SUM GAME? 
 
As we have just seen, safe harbours considerably increase efficiency and liquidity 
but may lead to the collateral cover being stretched thinly. The connection with 
the second — more prominent — rationale for safe harbours is obvious: the 
question of how much collateral is available is of immediate importance for 
systemic stability: more efficiency increases the availability of collateral which is 
generally beneficial—but overstretching is harmful because there will be no 
reserves when collateral becomes scarce.  
Insolvency safe harbours have to date mainly been regarded as necessary to 
decrease the systemic risk inherent in the financial market, in particular to assist in 
avoiding the domino effect of bank insolvencies.72 The base argument builds on 
the fact that liquid derivatives and repo markets are essential to the overall 
efficiency of the financial markets. However, the reference values in derivative 
transactions and the value of collateral assets are subject to daily fluctuations, 
                                                                                                              
70 By way of simplified example: a bank’s derivative and repo portfolio is taken into account at a gross 
risk of 1000 GBP because there are no safe harbours. This risk needs to be matched, at the current 
minimum rate of 10.5% regulatory capital, by 105 GBP in own share capital. In other words, the amount 
of issued share capital limits the possibility to take on more risk. However, if netting is allowed the bank 
can, on the basis of the same 105 GBP in share capital, enter into contracts exposing it to a gross risk of 
5000 GBP if we assume that close-out netting reduces the gross risk by 80%. 
71 See Paech, Unidroit Doc 2. 
72  See, in particular, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report and Recommendations of the 
Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group (2010), 36-40 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf> accessed 
10 March 2015. For US legislative history see Mooney, ‘The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors’ (n 9) 247-
251. 
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necessitating frequent, even daily adjustment of relevant collateral levels to manage 
the risk efficiently. That risk mitigation mechanism would lose its effectiveness 
should one of the parties become insolvent and should normal insolvency tools 
apply, such as, in particular, cherry-picking and the stay on termination and set-
off.73 In other words, derivatives and repo transactions need specific exemptions 
from the usual ‘threats’ that flow from the opening of insolvency proceedings. 
First, the insolvency of one of these institutions could provoke the failure of its 
counterparties which, alone or jointly, might in their turn bring down others, 
sparking off a chain reaction. Secondly, there is significant potential for 
transmission of liquidity problems between market participants. Thus, the 
limitation (or near-elimination) of individual counterparty credit risk is expected to 
have a beneficial effect on systemic stability. In other words, privileges afforded to 
counterparties of a failing institution would translate into systemic stability and 
therefore into advantages benefiting the market as a whole. This argument is 
particularly relevant to the financial sector, even more than to other sectors, such 
as automotive, as financial institutions are so closely intertwined.74 Network 
externalities are therefore much more likely to occur than they are in other 
industries, and furthermore spread from the financial sector throughout entire 
economies.75 On the basis of this broad argument, safe harbour rules have been 
successively introduced in over 40 jurisdictions.  
However, in light of the significant economic benefits that come with safe 
harbours, some authors regard them as the result of path-dependent legislation 
originally set off by banks’ own lobbying efforts.76 These, they argue, should now 
be considerably restricted or repealed altogether, since they actually created 
systemic risk rather than curbed it.77 The reasons brought forward in relation to 
this argument are appealing, and the picture is certainly a complex one. The recent 
introduction of bank resolution regimes has addressed these concerns directly by 
introducing a short 2-day stay on liquidation (which is imposed by regulatory order 
and prohibits any termination, set-off or enforcement of collateral), expressly 
conceived to avoid adverse the systemic effects of liquidation. Thus, while, on the 
one hand, credit risk contagion is effectively inhibited by close-out netting and 
collateral as protected by safe harbour rules, it is also true that, on the other hand, 
these mechanisms can at the same time develop adverse systemic effects through 
other transmission mechanisms.78 Broadly speaking, relevant examples fall into 
two categories of risk transmission mechanism, to wit, moral hazard and 
collateral/liquidity shortages.  
                                                                                                              
73 See Unidroit Principles on Close-out Netting, Principles 6 and 7. 
74 Cf. Edwards and Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code’ (n 12) 11. 
75 Bliss and Kaufman (n 12), ‘Repeal the Safe Harbors’ (n 12) 329  
76 Schwarcz and Sharon, ‘The Bankruptcy Law Safe-Harbor’ (n 12). 
77 Lubben, ‘Repeal the Safe Harbors’ (n 12); Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 12). 
78  K Pistor (n 17) sections 3.2 and 4.3 provides evidence that the antagonising effects of financial law, ie, 
creating and threatening liquidity at the same time, are a general and logical characteristic of the market.  
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While these two typical systemic risk transmitters can, in principle, antagonise 
the systemically beneficial effects of safe harbours, it would not make sense to 
analyse this interdependency in isolation. Regulation is much more relevant to the 
limitation of systemic risk and directly addresses the relevant contagion 
mechanisms other — often novel — measures. This leads to the question of 
whether the important influence insolvency law has on conduct makes it an 
appropriate means to control systemic risk and the behaviour of market 
participants while they are going concerns. In the following sections, I shall 
attempt to combine these aspects to form an overall picture.  
 
MORAL HAZARD  
 
Safe harbours create a transaction environment for financial institutions that is 
almost entirely free of counterparty risk. This places financial institutions in a 
privileged position as compared to other, non-financial counterparties (although, 
as discussed in the second part of this article the degree of privilege differs from 
one jurisdiction to another79). Thanks to these privileges, risk is shifted to non-
financial counterparties, which alone have to bear the specific cost of bankruptcy. 
In that, safe harbour rules have an effect quite comparable to that of traditional 
security interests. 
The existence of such a privilege is bound to affect the perception and 
conduct of market participants generally. As a result, the existence of safe 
harbours may provoke moral hazard.80 In the context of financial regulation, the 
term ‘moral hazard’ describes a mechanism whereby real or presumed guarantees 
and other risks shift away from the financial sector and render the financial market 
more risk-prone on an aggregate basis. The phenomenon has been identified as a 
major driver of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. For years, financial institutions had 
enjoyed high income generated by excessive risk-taking in the expectation that the 
cost of failure would be socialised. After the crisis, a number of regulatory changes 
were introduced in an attempt to tame moral hazard, with a view to re-allocating 
to financial institutions and their stakeholders the risk they themselves create.81  
Shifting the risk as such does not necessarily entail moral hazard. All kinds of 
insolvency privileges shift risk around the various types of creditors of the 
                                                                                                              
79 See second Part. Even insolvency privileges less significant than those provided for in the USA under 
USC Title 11, notably in more creditor-friendly jurisdictions, such as England and Belgium, and to some 
extent Germany and Italy, still provide more favourable treatment in relation to the three main concerns 
identified above. Some of the privileges may only come into play on the fringes, yet termination and set-
off rights are better protected and collateral can be enforced more easily as compared to standard 
situations. Protection against avoidance of pre-insolvency transactions is considerably better in all 
jurisdictions. 
80 Roe, Derivatives Market Payment Priorities, 545. See Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 578, 
589-592. 
81 These measures include remuneration of bank managers; higher bank capital requirements, new bank 
resolution regimes, stricter regulation of derivatives introduction of anti-cyclical capital and liquidity 
buffers, and others. See for an overview of all EU initiatives < http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-
policy/policy/map_reform_en.htm#row7> accessed 10 March 2015.   
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insolvent. The question, rather, is whether that shift entails a behavioural pattern 
that increases the risk overall, i.e., whether the level of systemic risk in the market 
as a whole increases. 
Such an overall rise in systemic risk could be caused in particular by market 
inefficiencies. Already in relation to traditional security interests, the possibility for 
bigger players to demand security indirectly subsidises their businesses at the cost 
of certain other players, since the latter are unable to adjust to the increased risk.82 
The effect of the risk transfer caused by insolvency safe harbours is similar: parties 
to whom risk is shifted are generally remote from the financial sector and as a 
result lack the ability to monitor the shift and adjust their own behaviour, in 
particular by demanding a higher risk premium or by not entering into the relevant 
position or quitting it altogether.83 The risk-taming effect of corrective behaviour 
at that end of the market is lacking, and this in turn renders the distribution of risk 
inefficient and the market overall riskier. It is worth noting that this shift of risk is 
global, as in practice all eligible creditors will take the necessary steps to get ahead 
of the pool by using the safe harbours.84 The risk is shifted to those that have no 
means of improving their position in any insolvency proceedings: in particular 
depositors, unsecured bond holders, share holders and ‘ordinary’ creditors of the 
insolvent. It is true that only few of these market participants are non-adjusting in 
the proper sense, traditionally retail depositors (which are now protected often 
protected by own preferences and/or deposit insurance) and ordinary creditors. 
However, mindful of the too-big-to-fail phenomenon, to which safe harbours 
contribute by allowing for exponential growth of the derivatives and repo markets, 
the State has traditionally assumed the risk as a whole, so that even adjusting 
creditors have no need to take the shift of risk into account.85 
Furthermore, security may distort managerial diligence in the choice of 
counterparties.86 As before, this argument can be translated into the context of 
insolvency safe harbours: financial counterparties rely exclusively on the risk-
mitigation tools guaranteed under the safe-harbour regimes instead of investing 
into ex ante and on-going monitoring of their counterparties.87 Yet, this 
overreliance on safe harbours could also lead to moral hazard.88 By contrast, if, in 
                                                                                                              
82 See Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk’(n 16) 639.  
83 Edwards and Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code, 32, 34; Roe, Derivatives Market 
Payment Priorities, 570; V Finch, Security, Insolvency and Risk – Who Pays the Price?, 62 Modern Law 
Review (1999), 633, 644-645 (in relation to traditional security interests). 
84 See Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law, 36. 
85 See Roe, Derivatives Market Payment Priorities, 558-559; Peck, Mokal and Janger, ‘Financial 
Engineering’ (n 8), 12. It is debatable whether this holds true in all respects. The implicit State guarantee 
for banks might be regarded as the price paid for having energetic, growth-producing and stimulating 
financial markets. Although recent regulatory initiatives attempt to remove the State guarantee 
completely, it is not absolutely certain whether financial markets that go beyond pure utility banking can 
be governed in a way that makes bail-outs completely unnecessary in the future. See also more generally 
Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, (n 17) 323. 
86 See Finch, Security, Insolvency and Risk, 646. 
87 Roe, Derivatives Market Payment Priorities, 560-561. 
88 Roe, ibid. 
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the absence of safe harbours, monitoring were a necessity, any concentration of 
risk on certain players would be detected and priced in by potential counterparties; 
as a consequence, there would be more players with smaller risk portions in the 
market, and the market more diversified overall.89 Moreover, in times of crisis, 
with falling or unclear collateral value, the information obtained through 
monitoring would allow lending to continue as healthy counterparties could 
continue to operate even in adverse times.90  
However, it is moot whether a case of moral hazard can be built on the 
foregoing. It is not evident that the market becomes riskier overall, as compared to 
the hypothetical alternative, a market without safe harbours. Hard evidence of 
such a connexion is difficult to establish and is often attempted with an eye to a 
preconceived result.91 To begin with, obviously, improved monitoring is always 
beneficial.92 Yet the value of monitoring highly complex, international and 
interconnected counterparties is limited. Comprehensive data regarding the 
counterparties is unlikely to be available. Even where such data is available, its 
value is limited as counterparties’ balance sheets are not static and are subject to 
network externalities, since the riskiness of assets depends on the market as a 
whole.93 Therefore, the available data says little about the riskiness of a balance 
sheet in times of stress. In other words, monitoring counterparties to prevent risk 
is generally useful but not as powerful a tool as reducing counterparty risk through 
security, collateral and close-out netting — for which the existence of safe 
harbours is essential. 
Speaking more generally, moral hazard, together with the too-big-to-fail 
argument, are amongst the main phenomena that have been identified as the 
origins of the recent financial crisis. They are not triggered by the existence of safe 
harbours alone but by an amalgam of causes and incentives and, probably, the 
fundamental socio-economic set-up of the financial market as a whole.  Repealing 
or restricting safe harbour regimes is not, therefore, necessarily a suitable means of 
removing moral hazard, in particular because safe harbours are foremost 
concerned with enforceability of contractual rights and only have an indirect 
influence on behaviour. Instead, measures explicitly designed to address moral 
hazard and to-big-to-fail are more focussed and therefore more effective, such as 
bank resolution (discussed below), structural reforms cutting down the size and 
interconnectedness of banks and reform of pay structures that dis-incentivise 
excessive risk taking.94 These measures address moral hazard and to-big-to-fail 
                                                                                                              
89 Roe, ibid.; Peck, Mokal and Janger, ‘Financial Engineering’ (n 8), 12. 
90 Roe, Derivatives Market Payment Priorities, 567-568.  
91 See Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 589.  
92 See, in particular, efforts to strengthen due diligence regarding counterparties instead of exclusive 
reliance on credit ratings Financial Stability Board, ‘Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings’ 
(27.10.2010) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_101027.pdf?page_moved=1> accessed 10 March 2015.   
93 See, e.g., AG Haldane and RM May, ‘Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems’ (2011) 469 Nature 351-
355. 
94 See, e.g., Financial Stability Board, Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (2.4.2009) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0904b.pdf>; Principles for an Effective 
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directly, instead of using the threat of unenforceability, the consequences of which 
are difficult to contain, as a vehicle. They are currently being refined and 
implemented on a wide scale, but of course this does not per se exclude 
complementary adjustments to the safe harbour regime should they prove 
necessary. 
 
COLLATERAL/LIQUIDITY SHORTAGES  
 
When a financial institution enters troubled waters, the safe harbour-protected 
liquidation rights of counterparties will be triggered at some point. The contractual 
arrangements with basically all counterparties are highly likely to be affected 
simultaneously.95 Such a scenario of mass liquidation can have adverse systemic 
effects that antagonise the beneficial systemic effects of safe harbours.96 The two 
following examples illustrate how safe harbour rules can limit and spread 
contagion at the same time — ‘which effect is more important is conceptually 
indeterminate’, thereby weakening the systemic risk rationale for insolvency safe 
harbours.97  
A first example98 of off-setting systemic benefits and drawback relates to a 
phenomenon that was a major transmission mechanism for systemic risk during 
the recent financial crisis. The failure of a major participant in the highly 
concentrated derivatives market causes a liquidity and collateral shortage. Safe 
harbours, on the one hand, protect the market from these failures because the 
relevant counterparties can have recourse to close-out netting and seize collateral. 
Thus, the failure of a major player is unlikely immediately to cause further 
insolvencies through the domino effect. However, all the insolvent’s 
counterparties would need to replace all terminated contracts in order to re-hedge 
their open positions, i.e., a large number of new contracts would be created 
elsewhere in the market within a very short time frame. Fire-sale liquidation of 
collateral and the sale of further assets to be able to post cash collateral under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Risk Appetite Framework, (18.11.2013) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_131118.pdf>; Progress and Next Steps towards Ending To-Big-To-Fail (2.9.2013) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130902.pdf>. All URLs accessed 10 
March 2015. Many, if not most, post-crisis legislative initiatives address moral hazard and to-big-to-fail in 
one way or the other. 
95 See, e.g., Section 5(a)(vi) ISDA master agreement, the ‘cross-default’ provision following which a 
default event will occur if a party defaults on a third-party obligation and the default or the obligation is 
in excess of a specified threshold amount.  
96 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (n 69) para 115; Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes of 
Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (2014), paragraphs 4.3-4.4 and Annex IV; See 
Bliss and Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk, 20; Duffie and Skeel, ‘Cost and Benefits of Automatic 
Stays’ (n 13) 10. 
97 Roe, Derivatives Market Payment Priorities, 566-567. See Edwards and Morrison, Derivatives and the 
Bankruptcy Code, 2. 
98 See Bliss and Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk, 11, 18-19 and fig. 2; Edwards and Morrison, 
Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code, 10-11; Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, Rolling Back the Repo Safe 
Harbors, 14-16; Roe, Derivatives Market Payment Priorities, 545-546 (n 12). 
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new contracts might considerably depress asset prices and might still push the 
entire market into a collateral crunch. 
A second example99 relates to the situation of financial institutions that are 
already ailing but not yet technically insolvent, or in relation to which no 
proceedings have been opened yet. Does the protection of close-out netting and 
collateral arrangements exacerbate or improve their financial position? On the one 
hand, if parties are properly collateralised, close-out netting and collateral 
arrangements ensure that a market participant is able to continue trading, since as 
long as there is no actual failure (or other termination event), its counterparties will 
see no immediate need to pull out of the relationship.100 Thus close-out netting 
and collateral, at this stage, can help to prevent a further deterioration of the 
financial position of an ailing firm. On the other hand, it might be argued that as 
soon as the market becomes aware of financially deteriorating conditions, 
collateral arrangements will lead to calls for additional collateral, since the 
collateral taker will have initially contented itself with collateral the value of which 
was inferior to the actual exposure (which is common practice between financially 
healthy parties). This would force the ailing firm into a liquidation of assets in 
order to meet these demands and spark a depression in asset prices, as the 
valuation of assets is based on market price (‘mark-to-market’), further aggravating 
the situation. The moment the firm failed to provide sufficient collateral to one of 
its many counterparties, thereby triggering close-out, cross-default clauses would 
ensure that virtually all contracts with other market participants were closed out at 
the same time, thus leaving the firm totally unhedged. Its financial position will 
prevent it from replacing these hedges at market price, a situation guaranteed to 
propel it over the brink of insolvency very quickly, rendering any further attempts 
at restoring viability useless. 
This example points to the important issue of insufficient levels of initial 
collateralisation (generally called ‘initial margin’), which has been an important 
crisis accelerator. Safe harbour regimes allow for adjusting or margining during the 
lifetime of the contract. As a consequence, parties often do accord not to provide 
collateral from the outset but do so only later, typically when the financial situation 
of one of them deteriorates. 101 However, from the insolvency law perspective, the 
rational for this exceptions was to prevent unenforceability of collateral provided 
prior to insolvency, including collateral provided during a so-called suspect period, 
since, from the point of view of the estate, there is no need for avoidance.102 The 
background here is that margining requires such an exemption as otherwise there 
would always be a residual risk that margining could be avoided by the court, 
notably on grounds of preferential treatment of creditors. If applied consistently, 
                                                                                                              
99 See Bliss and Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk, 10, 19. Roe, 'Derivatives Market Payment 
Priorities', 565-566; see also Edwards and Morrison 2005, 91, 94, 101 (citing the example of the failure of 
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998). 
100 See Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, 'Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors', 9 (n 12). 
101 See FSB, ‘Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reform’ (2010) para 3.6.2 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_101025.pdf> accessed 22 March 2015. 
102 See Recital 16 Financial Collateral Directive.  
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margining does not actually constitute preferential treatment. Other creditors are 
not disadvantaged because there is no net outflow of assets from the pool. 
However, safe harbour rules in many jurisdictions do not distinguish on the basis 
of the criterion of net outflow but restrict avoidance more generally.103 As a 
consequence, later delivery of collateral is not voidable even in cases in which 
there is a net outflow of assets. In practice, parties use this freedom in ‘good times’ 
to suspend the provision of initial margin for an indeterminate period, notably as 
long as the obligor is financially healthy.104 Yet this practice probably offends 
against the rationale for safe harbours, as collateral posted on these grounds within 
the ‘suspect period’ before insolvency could be regarded as a preference in that it 
does not merely reflects an increased obligation.105 It is also problematic in terms 
of systemic risk, as it does not require a great flight of the imagination to see that 
not enough collateral would be available should calls for additional collateral occur 
on a wider scale across the market, which is exactly the mechanism that caused the 
insolvency of AIG during the financial crisis. Any defaults on calls for additional 
collateral would trigger liquidation under the relevant master agreements. Thus, 
insufficient initial margin, to the extent made possible by the insolvency safe 
harbours, would appear to be a significant crisis accelerator. However, again, this 
problem could potentially be addressed from different angles. The insolvency safe 
harbours could either be narrowed so that calls for additional margin that went 
beyond a mere adjustment of values could be avoided, or regulation could impose 
proper collateralisation on the parties. After the crisis, the international community 
went for the second option by setting standards on initial margin while at the same 
time upholding the safe harbours in this respect.106 These standards pay particular 
attention to the equilibrium of systemic risk on the one hand and liquidity on the 
other hand, notably by imposing gradual requirements that are also phased in over 
a longer period. This measure is complimentary to other regulatory rules, such as 
transparency requirements regarding repo portfolios, restrictions on re-use of 
collateral securities, mandatory haircuts107, liquidity buffers and requirements for 
                                                                                                              
103 See, in particular, Recital 16 Financial Collateral Directive: ‘[…] The intention [of restricting 
avoidance] is merely that the provision of top-up or substitution financial collateral cannot be questioned 
on the sole basis that the relevant financial obligations existed before that financial collateral was provided, or that 
the financial collateral was provided during a prescribed period. […]’ (emphasis added). 
104 Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 13) 563. 
105 Roe, ibid., 573; Mooney, ‘The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors’ (n 9), 257; Skeel and Jackson, 
‘Transaction Consistency’ (n 13) 190-191. 
106 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Board of the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions, ‘Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives’ (March 2015) 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d317.htm> accessed 17 March 2015; IOSCO Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems, ‘Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures’ (April 2012) Principle 6 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf; Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories 
(commonly called ‘EMIR’) Article 46(1).  
107 ‘Haircut’ is market vernacular for a risk control measure applied to underlying assets whereby the 
value of those underlying assets is calculated as their market value reduced by a certain percentage (the 
‘haircut’). Haircuts are applied by a collateral taker in order to protect itself from losses resulting from 
declines in the market value of the collateral asset in the event that it needs to liquidate that collateral, see 
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central clearing and reporting of derivatives.108 All these measures are conceived to 
directly address the systemic risk flowing from the use of repos and securities 
lending transactions and derivatives, amongst other purposes. It would not be 
possible to achieve similarly well-calibrated solutions to that problem by 
abolishing or restricting safe harbour regimes — such an approach would be too 
bold and the resulting legal uncertainty would paralyse the market as nobody could 
rely on enforceability of contractual risk mitigation. 
 
BANK RESOLUTION AND SYSTEMIC RELEVANCE109 
 
As discussed before, one of the rationales of safe harbours is the need to prevent 
the systemic consequences of the failure of financial institutions. Obviously, not 
every failure need trigger systemic risk: for instance, the breakdown of a local 
savings bank will leave the wider financial world and economy largely unaffected. 
Typically, the systemic importance of financial institutions grows with increasing 
size, irreplaceability and interconnectedness.110 Therefore, safe harbours have the 
most effect where they protect large, interconnected institutions from the 
insolvency of their peers. However, it now appears that this understanding should 
be fundamentally revised, as the largest financial institutions will, in future, no 
longer enter into insolvency proceedings but instead will face ‘resolution’. 
Supervisory authorities will now in practice use this new, special administrative 
procedure to stave off consequences of the kind experienced in the wake of the 
Lehman failure, deploying various tools such as transferring viable business to a 
state-owned bridge bank or a healthy other bank, or converting debt owed by the 
failing bank into shares of it (‘bail-in’). Resolution regimes are now being 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
European Central Bank online glossary, 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/glossh.en.html> accessed 10 March 2015. 
‘Mandatory haircut’ refers to a legal requirement to apply such abatement for risk management purposes, 
see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Board of the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions, ‘Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives’ (March 2015) 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d317.htm> accessed 17 March 2015. Also cf the meaning of 
‘mandatory haircut’ outside the financial context 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/03/26/north-korea-kim-jong-un-hair_n_5033929.html> 
accessed 10 March 2015.  
108 See, in particular, European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on reporting and transparency of securities financing transactions (29.01.2014) 
COM(2014) 40 final <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-40-EN-F1-
1.Pdf> accessed 9 April 2015; FSB, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking, 
(29.8.2013) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130829a.pdf>; Regulatory 
Framework for Haircuts on non-centrally cleared securities Financing Transactions (14.10.2014) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141013a.pdf as well as the measures 
listed in n 106.  
109 I am grateful to Johannes Rehahn, research assistant at the LSE Law Department, for his valuable 
assistance on this section. 
110 International Monetary Fund/Bank for International Settlements/Financial Stability Board, Guidance to 
Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations (2009) paras 
12-15 <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
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introduced globally111 and apply to banks, investment firms,112 and, increasingly, 
financial market infrastructures,113 the three most important categories of financial 
institution in systemic terms. Insolvency of systemically important financial 
institutions will therefore be a well-nigh redundant concept. There will be no 
insolvency official or court involved and cherry-picking and avoidance for 
preference will not be available. Insolvency safe harbours will therefore remain 
relevant only to the counterparties of failing financial institutions other than 
banks, investment firms and financial market infrastructures. 
Even where master agreements provide for termination and close-out upon 
reorganisation or restructuring,114 resolution regimes eschew the route of 
privileged treatment through a safe harbour-like mechanism. Instead, they espouse 
the idea of a stay or moratorium with automatic effect or one which may, and 
probably as a rule will, be imposed on the counterparties of the institution under 
resolution by regulators.115 This breathing space was introduced to allow the 
competent authority to evaluate the financial contracts of an ailing institution and 
to decide which should be transferred to a healthy institutions and which should 
remain in the ailing estate and be wound up. The idea is also to avoid important 
changes on the balance sheet caused by extensive exercise of termination rights.116 
Resolution regimes are more clear-cut in this regard than insolvency laws. There 
are no exceptions from the administrative stay comparable to safe harbour rules in 
                                                                                                              
111 The US introduced this mechanism in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act in 1991 to address negative 
externalities potentially caused by the exercise of termination rights. The FDIA was originally applicable 
to institutions with a banking licence. After the Financial Crisis, the US modelled a broader rule on the 
FDIA that was included in the Dodd-Frank Act, sections 201(a)(11), 203, now also covering bank 
holding companies and, under certain conditions, non-banks. England and Germany adopted similar 
rules in 2009 and 2010. Also in 2010, the mechanism was elevated to global best practice by the FSB and 
several jurisdictions have since followed suit. In 2011, the FSB published twelve main features of 
effective resolution regimes which were updated in October 2014; see Financial Stability Board, Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (2014) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
The EU introduced a common rule in 2014 which is to be implemented in all Member States by 2015; see 
Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and 
(EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council [2014] OJ L173/190. 
112 See article 1(1)(a) BRRD; sections 201(a)(7), (8), (11), 203(b) Dodd-Frank Act. 
113 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures/International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures (2014) para 2.2.3 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD455.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015; Financial 
Stability Board (n 94) para 1.2. In the EU, the Consultation on a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of financial institutions other than banks was closed on 28 December 2012. No further steps 
have been taken so far. Under US law, large parts of the financial market infrastructure are already 
covered; see sections 201(a)(8), (11), (14), 102(a)(4)(C) Dodd-Frank Act. 
114 See, for example, sections 10(a)(vi), (b)-(g), 2(a)(v) of the 2011 Global Master Repurchase Agreement; 
section 5(a)(vii) ISDA 2002 Master Agreement: 'a general assignment, arrangement or composition with 
or for the benefit of its creditors' is assigned to be an Event of Default and Termination Event. 
115 Articles 69-71 BRRD; section 210(c)(10)(B) Dodd-Frank Act. 
116 Recital (94) BRRD. 
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insolvency law.117 Indeed, the stay typically ends after two days and termination 
rights do not re-emerge in relation to those parts of the business saved by the 
regulator, in particular by transferring them to a financially healthy institution such 
as another bank. Termination rights are only revived in respect of those contracts 
which remain in the now isolated ‘toxic’ part of the estate which is destined to be 
liquidated by recourse to ordinary liquidation proceedings.118 But this rump estate 
would typically not be of systemic importance. 
However, if systemic risk is increasingly  brought under control by regulatory 
changes, ‘what then remains of the original rationale for the safe harbours’?119 As a 
consequence of the introduction of resolution regimes, counterparties of an ailing 
financial institution will fall into one of the following three categories. Firstly, they 
will include those market participants that are not covered by safe harbour rules; 
these will generally belong to the non-financial world and will not be of systemic 
importance to the financial sector. Secondly, they will encompass those financial 
market participants generally covered to the extent that they deal with banks, 
investment firms and financial market infrastructures, which will in practice never 
become insolvent but enter resolution proceedings as they fail. Thirdly, they will 
include those financial market participants that are generally covered to the extent 
that they contract with a counterparty that enters insolvency proceedings as it fails, 
which means any financial institution other than banks, investment firms and 
financial market infrastructures or one of the aforementioned where the regulator 
decides not to invoke resolution but to allow the market participant to fail as it is 
of no systemic importance.  
As a result, the safe harbour rules will remain without effect in the most 
systemically relevant failures, notably those of systemically relevant banks, 
investment firms and infrastructures. Instead, regulators will use a completely 
different set of legal mechanisms to avoid contagion, including a stay on 
termination of contracts. Where insolvency proceedings may still occur, notably 
upon failure of a systemically irrelevant financial institution, the systemic risk 
rationale of safe harbours does not bite: the failure of such an institution is 
unlikely to contribute significantly to systemic risk, either through knock-on 
effects on counterparties or by leading to a liquidity crunch.120 Thus, it is probably 
fair to state that the introduction of bank resolution regimes has considerably 
reduced the scope of application of safe harbours mainly to systemically irrelevant 
scenarios. This does however not remove the importance of safe harbours for all 
types of financial institution which occur before resolution or insolvency 
proceedings are opened, as described earlier.  
 
                                                                                                              
117 However, title transfer financial collateral arrangements and set-off and netting arrangements shall be 
protected against split-up in the event of a transfer; see article 77 BRRD. 
118 Articles 71(1)-(5), 118 BRRD. The suspension does not, however, apply where the counterparty is a 
central bank, a central counterparty or a settlement system, ibid (3); section 210(c)(8)(A) and (10)(B) 
Dodd-Frank Act. 
119 Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, 'Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors', 3. 
120 Bliss and Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk, 17. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Insolvency safe harbours are conceived on the basis of a double rationale. On the 
one hand, safe harbours allow for exponentially increased market liquidity based 
on the highly efficient use of assets for purposes of collateralisation. Literally any 
type of asset, regardless of its legal nature, can now be turned into cash using repo 
or derivatives transactions. Differences between cash, claims and securities 
become irrelevant and the importance of the legal nature of rights in these assets 
(traditionally full title, security interest or claim) equally vanishes. As a 
consequence, the concept of ‘asset’ assimilates with the concept of ‘liquidity’ as all 
positions held by a financial institution with its counterparty form part of the same 
gigantic current account—the grand total of which, the ‘net amount’, corresponds 
to the risk exposure. The amount of liquidity created through safe harbours, which 
mirrors the degree to which risk is shifted, depends on the scope of safe harbours 
(which types of transaction? Which types of financial institution?) as chosen by the 
relevant legislator. 
On the other hand, insolvency safe harbours limit — or even well-nigh 
eliminate — individual counterparty credit risk for the sake of increased overall 
systemic stability. However, the systemic risk aspect of the rationale is much more 
complex than commonly understood and goes far beyond the idea that domino-
like contagion is avoided from the outset because the counterparties of the 
insolvent party will not fail as a consequence of the safe harbour protection. 
Rather, that — valid — argument is at the same time supported and countered by 
other mechanisms that either limit (e.g., avoidance of runs on ailing firms) or 
increase (e.g., moral hazard) the systemic risk. Which of these effects will prevail 
depends on the concrete circumstances and is difficult to predict. The systemic 
risk rationale is further weakened by the appearance of bank resolution regimes. 
These new administrative procedures render safe harbours largely irrelevant as 
tools to mitigate systemic risk. 
Furthermore, both the liquidity and the risk rationale are closely intertwined. 
The highly efficient use of homogenised assets on a cross-border, globalised basis 
makes collateral more readily available and at lower cost, but at the same time 
spreads the collateral cover very thinly over the market: it is large and flexible but 
can break easily if something goes wrong. So again, what is beneficial generally 
(collateral more easily available) may turn out to be dangerous in times of stress 
(no asset reserves).  
The above leaves the legislator with a picture in which the containment of 
counterparty risk through safe harbours is clear, but where it is not so obvious 
whether the limitation of systemic risk is a good enough policy argument. This 
dilemma reflects the fact that in the financial market risk can be dispersed but will 
not effectively disappear until obligations are settled. Yet legislators, in their 
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normative decisions, opt for liquidity and strong growth of the financial market —
an argument well-known in the world of traditional security interests, which 
generally privileges major market players for the sake of a more liquid lending 
market. To the extent that safe harbours are based on a systemic risk rationale, this 
is at odds with reality – the main argument, at least today, is liquidity. This 
incongruence explains why the debate on safe harbours is so relevant to the US 
but much less so in other jurisdictions. Where insolvency law is more creditor-
friendly from the outset, liquidity of assets is a more attractive argument than it is 
in debtor-focused insolvency regimes.  
Still, repealing or fundamentally revising the concept of safe harbours with a 
view to avoiding adverse systemic effects is not only unnecessary but rather 
counter-productive.121 First, systemic risk is based on an amalgam of many 
different causes and incentives and changing the safe harbour regime would only 
address one isolated aspect, whereas the overall repercussions on risk management 
flowing from changes to the safe harbour regime are potentially negative. 
Secondly, insolvency law, though it has significant influence on market 
participants’ behaviour towards risk-taking while they are going concerns is too 
bold a tool to control that behaviour. This role is better vested in regulation. 
Regulation is able to address the vast majority of adverse systemic effects in which 
safe harbours may have a (smaller or larger) share, notably by establishing 
requirements for liquidity buffers, mandatory haircuts, initial margin requirements, 
central clearing etc., and in respect of risk-taking behaviour in a more selective 
way, without choking the liquidity made possible by the safe harbours. 
Furthermore, there is no equally effective risk mitigation tool at hand at the 
moment, especially not from a global point of view. Only safe harbours allow for 
cross-jurisdictional use of assets on the present scale, an effect that is achieved 
through homogenous insolvency regimes in this respect. This globalisation of 
asset use could never be achieved on the basis of traditional security, if only for 
reasons of lack of legal certainty. 
In the future, safe harbours will continue to spread to other jurisdictions. 
Insolvency safe harbours have a logical attraction for every aspiring financial 
market. The fact that safe harbours are an integral part of the capital requirements 
regime and the considerably increased liquidity that comes with safe harbours 
would make it virtually impossible for a jurisdiction to participate in the global 
financial market if they did not have a safe harbour regime. Contracting with 
market players from markets that lack safe-harbour protection is expensive and 
much riskier. Therefore, markets and regulators will need to continue 
implementing safe harbours, many using the Financial Collateral Directive of the 
UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting as blueprints. As long as 
fundamental ideas about the size of the financial market and the acceptance of the 
                                                                                                              
121 The recent report of the American Bankruptcy Institute on a possible reform of Chapter 11 (n 11) has 
stopped short of recommending a fundamental overhaul of the safe harbour concept. See, in particular, 
ibid. 102 in relation to the risk-accelerating effect of safe harbours. 
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risk naturally flowing from it are not re-thought, there is no viable alternative to 
insolvency safe harbours. 
 
